Several policies counter this conflict of interest. 4 Nevertheless, when the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") considers whether to approve sale of a drug, it relies upon clinical trials designed and controlled by the drug sponsor. 5 An ample record reveals that drug firms can design clinical trials in ways that bias the conclusions, 6 can misinterpret or misreport the trial data, or can engage in fraud. 7 Manufacturer bias can slant research when it is performed either inhouse, or when manufacturers finance or manage external researchers. 8 Today, drug firms typically rely mainly on external researchers, 9 using Contract Research Organizations ("CROs"), or university-based researchers to carry out clinical trials and/or to perform some or all of the analysis. 10 Drug firms may also contract with specialists to design trials. 11 The corrupting influence persists because the drug sponsor chooses who will conduct the trials, and these researchers depend on the sponsor for their income; 12 additionally, researchers report to the drug sponsor, not to the FDA. 13 Researchers, therefore, have incentives to advance the goals of the drug sponsor and to follow the drug sponsor's directives. 14 This Article explores a proposal that would preclude biased drug testing by removing all drug sponsor influence on the design and conduct of clinical trials for new drug applications ("NDAs"), a reform that would address the root of institutional corruption. 15 Recently advocated by leading 7. See, e.g., Rennie, supra note 6, at 995-96 (recounting a time when the author, as an editor of a major medical journal, realized that two authors had published dramatically conflicting results in different journals at the same time).
8. See Angell, supra note 6 (discussing how Contract Research Organizations ("CROs") are susceptible to bias by allowing manufactures near total control of study design and execution because drug companies are their only clients).
9. See Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 1539-40 (2000) (observing how drug companies increasingly rely on CROs and site-management organizations ("SMOs") to conduct research instead of traditional academic institutions).
10. Id. 11. Id. (describing how companies will have an external investigator design the trial if they lack internal personnel with the needed expertise, or will design the trial in-house and then submit it to investigators for review). 14. See Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 1543 (noting that the pharmaceutical companies who provide all or some of a researcher's financial support use the money as leverage when being presented with potentially unfavorable results).
See Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in
15. The concept of institutional corruption has been developed by Lawrence Lessig and Dennis Thompson. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS-AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 231-34 (2011) (defining institutional corruption using examples from various governments around the world); DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 37-43 (1995) (using the example scholars, the idea has a long history, yet was neglected for over half a century due to pharmaceutical industry opposition.
A. The Origins of Contemporary Pharmaceutical Regulation
Before examining the oversight of clinical trials, let us briefly review the evolution of the pharmaceutical industry over the last century. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the drug market was premised on the doctrine of laissez-faire. 16 Manufacturers did not have to test their drugs or disclose the ingredients, could make any therapeutic claim, and could sell any product directly to consumers. 17 Reformers and muckrakers-supported by the American Medical Association ("AMA")-spearheaded the fight for federal drug regulations. 18 In 1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act, which required manufacturers to disclose therapeutic ingredients on the drug label, and prohibited the sale of adulterated, misbranded, or deleterious products. 19 The law presumed that, with accurate labeling, individuals of five senators known as "The Keating Five" to describe institutional corruption); Dennis F. th century, patients could go directly to the pharmacy to buy drugs without a prescription, and pharmacists could promote wares they chose to sell).
17. could safely choose drugs. 20 Advertising of therapeutic claims remained unregulated until the Shirley amendments in 1912 prohibited false and fraudulent statements regarding the curative or therapeutic effect of drugs. 21 Industry opposition blocked enactment of the Roosevelt administration's 1933 bill to regulate drugs until a scandal in 1937. In order to improve the flavor of a sulfa-based drug called sulfanilamide, the Massengill Company added a chemical that was toxic, causing the rapid death of 106 people who had ingested the drug. 22 Congress then passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 ("FDCA"), which required drug firms to seek FDA permission to market drugs, and which allowed the FDA 60 days to deny authorization if it found that the drug was dangerous or improperly labeled. 23 Manufacturers then had incentives to conduct research and to evaluate their products. 24 The marketing of Thalidomide led to the birth of children with severe deformations in multiple countries, and created pressure for stronger regulation. 25 The 1962 amendments to the FDCA prohibited marketing of drugs unless the FDA granted approval, and the amendments removed the 60 day deadline for FDA review of new drugs. 26 The amendments required drug sponsors to demonstrate that drugs are effective-not only safe-for a designated use. 27 It also authorizes the FDA to withdraw its approval for drugs already on the market based on new evidence. 28 Manufacturers are required to track drug distribution to facilitate recalls of unsafe products, and to follow FDA standards for good manufacturing practices. 29 The law restricts promotion of drugs to 20. See TEMIN, supra note 16, at 4 (recalling that most consumers at the turn of the century chose drugs for themselves as opposed to a doctor choosing for them, so ensuring consumers knew what they were selecting and purchasing was a priority therapeutic uses approved by the FDA. 30 Promotional materials must note risks, as well as benefits, and summarize side effects and contraindications. 31 The FDA specifies what information the label must include, and labels must state the generic name, as well as the brand name. 32 In 1970, the FDA promulgated regulations that set standards for the evidence that manufacturers would have to submit in order to demonstrate that new drugs were safe and effective. 33 Since then, testing of drugs follow set stages. 34 After researchers have identified a potentially therapeutic molecule, they test its effects in laboratories on chemicals, cells, or tissues. 35 The FDA then requires firms to test its drugs for toxicity on animals. 36 Drug candidates that have not been ruled out due to toxicity or lack of efficacy can then be tested on humans in three phases. 37 In Phase I, researchers test the drug on a small number of human subjects only to determine whether it is toxic in humans, and if so, at what doses. 38 Phase II testing consists of a clinical trial in a larger group of patients in order to measure its benefits and risks. 39 Drugs that are not highly toxic are tested in Phase III clinical trials on a large number of human research subjects, and researchers then compare its effect with a control group. 40 alternative therapy. 41 Human subjects are randomly assigned to either the test group or the control group. 42 It is a double blind study, which means that the medication must be coded so that neither the physician who administers the drug, nor the individual taking the drug, knows which individuals receive the test drug and which individuals receive the placebo (or the standard therapy to which it is compared) until the code is broken after collection of data. 43 To counter the risk of fraud or unreliable studies, regulations establish standards for research methods, record keeping, and data reporting. 44 The FDA also inspects toxicological laboratories and facilities that conduct clinical trials in order to monitor compliance. 45 
B. Options for Control of Clinical Trials
There are six options for addressing conflicts of interest in clinical trials, which are displayed in Table 1 below. At one extreme, the drug sponsor has complete control over clinical trials; at the other extreme, the federal government conducts the clinical trials. Between these two poles are four strategies that can be used individually or combined. The FDA relies mainly on the second strategy, which has been supplemented in recent years by the fourth strategy. The first option ignores the conflict of interest in allowing drug firms to oversee their own research, and permits the drug firm to conduct clinical trials without any oversight. 46 The second strategy has the FDA regulate clinical trials that are conducted by drug firms, using standards for research. 47 The third strategy requires that only certified research organizations and researchers conduct clinical trials. 48 The fourth strategy promotes transparency of drug firm-sponsored research (since 2007, the United States has required registration of clinical trials to promote transparency 49 ). 50 The fifth strategy precludes drug firm bias by having the 46. See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text (explaining the conflict of interest in allowing drug firms to oversee their own research).
47. 57 Regulations could authorize the federal government or private organizations to certify researchers, and to require that only certified researchers and organizations conduct drug trials used to support NDAs. 58 To strengthen the transparency strategy, regulations could require that drug sponsors and their researchers make the clinical study report public (which drug firms currently only supply to the FDA) in order to comply with the FDA rules and international standards. 59 Clinical study reports contain key information related to the clinical trial, including: the study protocol, the designated clinical end points, discussion of methods and statistical analysis, tabulated data, and analysis of data. 60 Regulations could also require disclosure of clinical trial patient level data. 61 information public on clinical trials would allow independent researchers to review the analysis, or to perform their own evaluation. Proponents of this approach say that it would make it harder for drug sponsors to hide risks from the public, and that it would also help to hold the FDA accountable for its decisions. 62 New regulations that advanced the second, third, and fourth strategies would not remove the drug sponsor bias. Consequently, some critics have proposed ending the drug sponsor's control over clinical trials that the FDA uses to evaluate drugs. 63 This reform can be implemented through the fifth strategy (having the federal government contract with independent organizations to design and conduct clinical trials), or through the sixth strategy (having the federal government conduct the clinical trials). Under most formulations of these proposals, the drug sponsor would finance the drug testing, just as they currently do. Some proposals, however, would have the pharmaceutical industry collectively finance the testing; others propose that the federal government share the costs of drug testing with the pharmaceutical industry collectively, or with the drug sponsor. 64 
C. Contemporary Proposals for Independent Drug Testing
In the last two decades, several authors have called for independent drug testing. These proposals are supported by scholarly literature that documents publication bias as well as biased research design in drug company-controlled trials. 65 In 2004, Dr. Marcia Angell proposed the patient-level data addresses industry and societal concerns, and that the "way forward" is to disclose clinical trial patient level data).
62. See id. at 1593-94 (proposing a model that emphasizes independence, transparency, fairness, and reproducibility, which would allow for the release and review of findings, and further instill confidence in the public that efforts are not being manipulated by funding or coordinating organizations). 66 This proposal projected that the NIH would carry out the research through independent researchers at universities. 67 The data would belong to the institute and the researchers, and the results would be public. 68 The FDA would then rely on these studies to decide whether or not to authorize the marketing of the drug. 69 To fund the institute, drug firms would be assessed a percentage of their gross revenues. 70 In 1993, Doctors Wayne Ray, Marie Griffin, and Jerry Avorn proposed creating a governmental center that would assess drug effectiveness and compare the costs and benefits of alternative drug therapies. 71 The center would fund and/or conduct studies of drugs already approved for sale, and coordinate drug research performed by government agencies. 72 The authors would finance the center through a tax on drug sales and third-party payer subscription fees. 73 In 1996, Doctors Lisa Bero and Drummond Rennie advocated for legislation that would support independent studies of drug cost effectiveness and comparative effectiveness that would be funded by a user fee on pharmaceutical firms. 74 grants to researchers. 76 Researchers would receive all of their funds through their institutions and would not be allowed to receive other funds. 77 A group of scholars interested in public goods and intellectual property have also called for publicly funded clinical trials to ensure unbiased evaluation, and to reduce the cost of drug development. 78 They argue that if clinical trials were publicly funded, it would be unnecessary to grant patents or exclusive marketing periods to drug firms-at the very least, we could shorten the duration of the monopoly. 79 Additionally, these scholars note that lower prices would increase access to pharmaceuticals globally. 80 Most contemporary proponents of independent testing, however 83 The hearings revealed two main problems with relying on manufacturer testing: (1) the economic incentives of drug firms compromised their impartiality, biased the design of the clinical trials, and sometimes led to fraud; 84 and (2) testing laboratories and investigators performed shoddy work because they lacked training, and cut corners to boost income. 85 By 1960, the FDA found that many NDAs were based on poorly designed and implemented studies. 86 FDA investigations and congressional hearings revealed fraud by testing laboratories, physician investigators, and drug firms, finding quality problems that compromised the reliability of testing. 87 The FDA developed regulations to address these When the hearings began, the FDA had not yet developed regulations specifying how drugs should be tested under the 1962 FDA amendments. 102 The 1938 Food and Drug Act provided that manufacturers had to select reliable investigators, specifying that these reliable investigators needed to be experts qualified by scientific training." 103 The FDA declined to specify criteria that qualified individuals as experts, explaining that it was not authorized to control the practice of medicine. 104 Prior to regulations in 1970, there was little distinction between physicians and investigators. 105 Drug firms would frequently give investigational drugs to several practitioners to test on their patients. Pharmaceutical firms would draw on their reports or testimonials when submitting NDAs. The FDA recommended that specialists test the drugs in the diseases for which that drug would be used, and that firms employ several investigators, each of which would work independently in different locations to ensure a balanced assessment. 106 108. Id. (explaining that clinical studies served a dual purpose: not only were they arranged to gain scientific insight on the "clinical worthiness" of the said drug, but they also attempted to promote the drug to the medical profession to gain their acceptance and support).
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The hearing record included the New York Academy of Medicine's 1962 report on drug testing, which found that many tests were substandard because investigators lacked training or experience in designing studies, or in recording and reporting results. 110 The record noted that neither the FDA, nor any other official or professional body, had set standards for clinical investigators. 111 The report recommended that investigators should have training in clinical research, that pharmaceutical firms' medical directors should have experience in clinical testing, and that the research should take place in hospitals. 112 The report rejected two proposals, however, that would shift responsibility from drug firms to the federal government. The first proposal would establish a "national central office on testing . . . [that would] arrange to conduct and supervise the testing of all products." 113 The report argued that a national center would be overly bureaucratic, which would be unacceptable to pharmaceutical manufacturers and clinicians. 114 The second proposal, modeled on the AMA Committee on Therapeutic Trials, would establish a national referral agency for clinical investigators. 115 The report also did not support this idea due to the failure of the AMA's earlier testing plan. 116 In 1963, Consumers Union, which had built its reputation as an independent tester of consumer products, evaluated the 1962 FDA amendments in its journal, Consumer Reports. Consumer Unions said that the "fundamental question" is this: "is it good public policy to permit the drug manufacturers to do or to supervise the clinical testing of their own products?" 117 Consumers Union argued that since the FDA relied on reports "procured by the manufacturers," the arrangement was an inadequate substitute for "an objective testing agency." 118 121 where the facilities and core staff would be publicly funded. 122 In Dr. May's proposal, the FDA or other agencies would provide grants for individual research projects, and investigators would choose research projects based on scientific merit. 123 Several other physicians suggested that there should be a separation between firms sponsoring a new drug and researchers testing the drug. 124 One idea was to have the industry pool funds for testing new drugs. 125 More frequently, physicians have proposed even greater separation. 126 127. Id. at 1641 (explaining that all drugs should be clinically tested in FDA-approved trial centers located at teaching hospitals of medical schools before being released for sale). some independent noncommercial agency and not to any individuals or groups who are dependent . . . for financial support on pharmaceutical houses." 128 Doctors I.H. Page and Ray W. Gifford, Jr. of the Cleveland Clinic wrote that "an independent agency [should] be created to receive and administer funds to pay the costs of drug testing." 129 During this period, there were numerous examples of fraud in pharmaceutical firm-sponsored testing. 130 In 1962, reports of harmful side effects from the use of MER/29 (triparanol), a drug marketed to reduce blood cholesterol, led the manufacturer, which was a subsidiary of Richardson-Merrell, to stop selling the drug. 131 Investigations later found fraudulent reporting of the toxicological studies. 132 Investigations by the FDA and other federal agencies revealed fraudulent reporting of the toxicological studies by university based researchers. 133 There were also reports of bias arising from drug company sponsorships of drug trials, and the trade press reported on "rigging" of research. 134 A 1963 New England Journal of Medicine editorial criticized firms that set unethical publication restrictions, specifically those who only permitted publication of positive results. 135 In agency instead of the drug sponsor. 150 Dr. Dale Console, the former medical director of E. R. Squibb & Co., supported the creation of a central testing agency, which the federal government and pharmaceutical firms would jointly fund, and which would select investigators to conduct drug trials without the drug sponsors knowing their identity. 151 In contrast, Dr. Franz Inglefinger, editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, testified that independent testing, overseen by a government agency, would reduce the risk of bias, but that it might not be worth the cost. 152 Dr. Inglefinger thought it was sufficient to require drug firms to contract with universities to perform clinical trials. 153 Dr. Donald Mainland, who coordinated research for the American Rheumatism Association's Cooperating Clinics Committee, argued that drug firms could influence clinical trials when they were the intermediary between the FDA and researchers. 154 Congress, he said, should "take the evaluation of drugs entirely out of the producer's hands" after the completion of animal toxicological testing. 155 He favored the creation of an independent, not-for-profit drug testing agency that would provide research grants in a manner similar to the NIH, noting that the agency should be funded largely by the pharmaceutical industry in a manner that did not allow it to "influence the disposal of the money or interfere . . . with the trials." 156 Dr. Bean, head of internal medicine at the University of Iowa College of Medicine, supported having drug testing conducted by "a neutral judging body, professional competent, and quite independent of any extraneous source of financial support or any hint of obligation or connection with the . . . promoters of the drug." 159 In 1968, NIH director Dr. James Shannon called for having a federal agency evaluate drugs when the FDA deemed that the data it received from manufacturers were insufficient. 160 The agency would either conduct its own studies, or contract with independent institutions. 161 Conversely, Dr. Harry Dowling, an authority on drug safety, responded that it might be better instead for the FDA to develop an in-house capacity to evaluate drugs. 162 In 1971, Senator Nelson introduced an omnibus drug bill that would create independent third-party drug testing. 163 the FDA determines the safety and efficacy of a drug solely on the basis of information supplied by the drug company making the application. The dangers involved in the dependence on drug firms to perform, direct, or arrange for the testing of drugs in which they have a financial interest is obvious . . . . [T] here is an inevitable tendency-no matter how conscientious the firm-to emphasize the positive features and deemphasize the negative. Many of the people they engage to do their testing are equally anxious to secure additional contracts for drug testing . . . A physician who turns in unfavorable reports on the drugs he is testing may not have his contract renewed . . . . [S]ome firms have been guilty of misrepresenting, distorting, and even withholding information developed in their testing of drugs which may in any way retard or prevent an approval to market. Injury and death have resulted from such actions . . . . Testing of drugs should be done by specialists who have no direct relationship with the manufacturer, who cannot benefit financially from the results, [and] who are not motivated even subconsciously by the desire to get anything but the truth. 165 Senator Nelson introduced the omnibus bill again in 1973, and sponsored stand-alone bills for independent drug testing in each Congress until he lost his re-election bid in 1980. 166 The Nelson bill vested the federal government with responsibility for all testing of NDA and FDA drug reviews. 167 The Nelson bill also authorized the creation of a National Drug Testing and Evaluation Center within the FDA to oversee clinical investigations of new drugs, which meant that the federal government would perform the tests either through the testing center, or by contracting with independent organizations. 168 The Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") would decide whether each drug would be tested through the national testing center or an independent organization. 169 Drug companies would finance the testing center and the clinical trials by paying into a common fund, which the Secretary of HEW would draw from to pay for testing. 170 The Secretary would publicize the "methodology, results, and conclusions." 171 Drug sponsors could still conduct their own clinical trials, but they were subject to HEW regulations and public disclosure of the testing methods and results. 172 
D. 1973-1980: The Kennedy Hearings
Senator Ted Kennedy chaired hearings entitled "Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry" in 1973-1974, 173 as well as hearings entitled "Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry" from 1975-1979. 174 Kennedy also examined the Nelson proposal for independent drug testing, among other issues. 175 At the hearings in 1974 and 1976, which were held during the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, Charles Edwards (HEW Assistant Secretary for Health) and Alexander Schmidt (FDA Commissioner) opposed Senator Nelson's proposed national drug-testing center. 176 Commissioner Schmidt argued that economic incentives and tort liability created an incentive for drug firms to carry out proper studies, 177 and that the "professional integrity of toxicologists in the industry" helped to assure high quality investigations. 178 Commissioner Schmidt noted that having the federal government or independent labs perform the work would not necessarily improve the quality of testing. 179 Furthermore, Commissioner Schmidt announced that the FDA would create regulations to assure "good laboratory practice[s]" in animal testing, would inspect animal testing facilities, and would audit or review any data where there was suspicion of falsification. 180 Commissioner Schmidt also reported that the FDA had rejected the idea of drug testing under federal auspices, 181 as it was not feasible in the short term since the federal government lacked sufficient personnel and testing facilities. 182 Moreover, due to the dearth of independent laboratories, it was not possible to have independent third parties perform the tests. 183 Schmidt also argued that it would be too costly to have the federal government test drugs, as "there is no way that we can get the resources to put into this that drug companies do." 184 Furthermore, Schmidt argued that he believed "all monopolies, whether public or private, tend to stagnate, [so] the prospect of any single institution gaining such control over all preclinical drug investigation troubles me." 185 Both Commissioner Schmidt and HEW Assistant Secretary Edwards testified that having the FDA engage in or select firms to perform drug testing would mire the FDA in conflicting roles because the FDA would 177. See Examination of the Pharm. Industry, Part 5, supra note 176, at 2163 (statement of Alexander Schmidt, FDA Comm'r) ("Senator, you are assuming that we could do it better than industry, and I have some disagreement with that. I think the problem is not the system per se, but in the monitoring that we carry on of the system. We have underway at FDA, and have had for a couple of years an improved surveillance system of these clinical investigations that are being carried on behalf of the manufacturer. There is nothing wrong with the system. It is good, but we have over the years done a very poor job of surveillance, if you will, but I think first of all there is not enough talent to go around in terms of having the drug industry involved in clinical testing along with the Federal Government."). See also Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 92-93 (statement of Alexander Schmidt, FDA Comm'r) (discussing economic incentives, such as the pharmaceutical industry's practice of cross-checking data with competitors, and liability implications stemming from marketing an unsafe product).
178. ultimately evaluate the research performed under its aegis. 186 Edwards contended that "the public would be deprived of . . . FDA impartial review of clinical data." 187 Commissioner Schmidt claimed that all that was needed to ensure reliable trials was increased FDA oversight that is supported by FDA authority to issue subpoenas, examine records, and conduct investigations. 188 Edwards rebutted, however, with the opinion that a government center would not necessarily do a better job of testing than drug firms, and that industry bias could be countered through increased government surveillance. 189 The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association ("PMA") and the AMA both opposed the creation of a national drug testing and evaluation center. 190 PMA president, Joseph Stetler, argued that the proposal incorrectly assumed "that scientists will somehow be more objective if their work is done under government rather than private aegis," 191 and that creating the center would lead to a "drastic slowing down of drug research." 192 Speaking for the AMA, Dr. James Sammons argued that creating an FDA drug testing center would transform the FDA from a judge of research that was conducted by others into an organization that judged its own research. 193 Meanwhile, further investigations and hearings found that many clinical trials did not comply with legal requirements or research norms. 194 The FDA investigations of G. D. Searle in the early 1970s revealed poor oversight, negligence, and fraud in the firm's toxicological drug testing. 195 The FDA found "a pattern of conduct [,] which compromises the scientific integrity of the studies." 196 At the 1976 hearings, Gregory J. Ahart reported that a Government Accounting Office ("GAO") investigation concluded that there is "a lack of assurance that the data . . . upon which FDA bases its decision to approve a new drug . . . is accurate and reliable." 197 Subsequently, the FDA developed regulations for Good Laboratory Practices ("GLP"), 198 and introduced bio-research monitoring and inspection. 199 A 1977 study found poor compliance with these standards; 200 by 1979, however, compliance had risen to 88%. 201 Congressional testimony in 1976 made clear that there were then two types of problems with drug testing: first, manufacturers' bias compromised impartiality, and second, cost pressures led organizations to perform poor Id. at 365. It identified failure in: obtaining patient consent-35%; keeping accurate records of the amount of drugs received from sponsors and distributed to subjects-50%; adhering to study protocol-28%; maintaining accurate records reflecting the condition of the patient before, during, and after the study, and the nature of the laboratory work done and other therapy administered during the study-23%; retaining case records as required-22%; and properly supervising the study-12%. quality work. 202 Having a governmental agency rather than the manufacturer select the organization that performs the tests would eliminate bias. 203 Other measures were needed, however, to control for poor quality work due to economic pressures. 204 Officials from the National Cancer Institute described the procedures that they used to ensure that testing by outside firms was of high quality. 205 Dr. Sidney Wolfe of the Public Citizen's Health Research Group ("HRG") argued that "what we learn . . . is not to allow any more testing by industry or by companies, who owe their allegiance to industry," further explaining that "no kind of surveillance of any kind over conflicted and inadequate data is going to improve the quality of it." 206 In 1978, Senator Kennedy renewed his hearings, and testimony and documents revealed continued negligence, fraud, and fabrication of data. 207 Another theme that the hearings explored concerned the dependence of toxicological laboratories on drug firms for their continued operation. 208 Would the toxicological laboratories' dependence induce these labs to engage in fraud due to fear that the drug firms would not renew the labs' contract if they reported unfavorable results? Some witnesses suggested that drug firms instructed laboratories to fabricate data, a practice called "drylabeling." 209 Other witnesses and senators expressed concern that drug testers either failed to record data, or that drug testers fabricated data as a means to ensure that manufacturers would continue to employ them. 210 
E. The Carter Administration Report on New Drug Regulation
During the administration of President Jimmy Carter, the Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS") Review Panel on New Drug Regulation concluded that the current system was flawed since the "FDA must rely almost exclusively on the accuracy and objectivity of industrygenerated data [,] . . . [and b] ecause the company has a financial interest in successful test results, the present drug testing system contains an inherent bias." 211 The review panel explained that "[t]he most direct means of minimizing the bias in testing is to have research conducted by investigators who are financially independent of the drug sponsor." 212 The panel noted that the disadvantage of having the federal government conduct clinical trials was that "[i]f such testing were undertaken by the FDA, the agency would be in the untenable position of passing upon the result of its own research." 213 The panel, therefore, preferred a system under which "the government would be responsible for hiring and paying independent researchers, with the cost of research assessed to the sponsor," and where "[t]he information produced would be given to both the pharmaceutical sponsor and the FDA for analysis. 
F. The Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978
In 1978, the FDA and HEW supported the Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978, sponsored by Senator Kennedy and nine other senators. 215 The bill would have reformed the drug review process, and created some governmental capacity to evaluate drugs. 216 The bill also would have increased the FDA's role in overseeing the design and implementation of testing protocols, while requiring increased disclosure of clinical trial data. 217 The bill proposed a "National Center for Clinical Pharmacology" to conduct some intramural public clinical pharmacology research. 218 The Center's functions consisted of "conduct[ing] and support[ing] research in clinical pharmacology and clinical pharmacy, including investigations for:
(1) the safety and effectiveness of existing and new uses of drug products, (2) the development of drug products for diseases and other conditions of low incidence, [and] (3) drug products of special significance or with respect to which there is substantial controversy as to safety and effectiveness." 219 The pharmaceutical industry, physicians, and some consumer advocates opposed the reform, and as a result, the bill was never reported out of the committee. 217. See id. at 97 ("Subsection (f) establishes the requirements for the conduct of a drug innovation investigation [including] (1) confining distribution of the drug to experts qualified to investigate the drug or the disease under [the] study; (2) preventing the drug from being dispensed by investigators other than those specified to conduct the investigation; (3) conducting the investigation in accordance with the protocol submitted in the registration; (4) maintaining records, and submitting reports to the Secretary, regarding the investigation so that the Secretary may determine whether the conditions of registration are being fulfilled; (5) reporting to the Secretary information of newly discovered risks so that the Secretary may determine whether participants are being subjected to an unreasonable and significant risk of illness or injury; (6) complying with the requirements in section 130 regarding protection of human subjects in research; and (7) not promoting or commercializing the drug product.").
218. 221 and FDA audits also revealed continued fraud and flawed research. 222 In the 1980 election where Ronald Reagan was elected President, Senator Gaylord Nelson lost his bid for re-election, and the Senate majority shifted from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party. 223 These changes ended the congressional proposals for independent drug testing. 224 Discussion of independent drug testing in medical and popular journals then virtually ceased until the 1990s.
III. REVISITING PROPOSALS FOR INDEPENDENT DRUG TESTING

A. Assessing the Arguments Against Independent Drug Testing
In the 1960s and 1970s, opponents argued that independent drug testing was not feasible because there were insufficient independent private organizations to conduct toxicological tests and clinical trials, and additionally argued that the federal government lacked the capacity to perform this work. 225 The opponent's arguments were probably not correct then, and the arguments are certainly not true now. Today, rather than test drugs inhouse, manufacturers contract out this work. 227 Initially, universities performed most of this research, but over the last quarter century, drug firms shifted most of their clinical trials to for-profit CROs, which now constitutes a global industry. 228 Yet, testing by third parties still is not independent today. 229 Manufacturers either design the clinical trial or direct and oversee the researchers who do, and manufacturers also select the organization that conducts the research. 230 Researchers, whether in CROs or universities, depend on the drug manufacturer for their income and must follow the manufacturer's directions if they want to receive continued funding. 231 Public policy could promote the independence of existing contract research organizations and universities if a governmental agency selected both the entity that performed the clinical trials and monitored its work. 232 Furthermore, by allocating funds for the research, the agency could spur the growth of organizations with high standards for integrity, quality, and independence. 233 For example, the internationally recognized Mario Negri Pharmacological Institute has performed independent clinical trials in Europe for nearly 50 years, has published more than 13,000 original scientific papers in scientific journals, and now conducts about 80 clinical trials a year. 234 Independent testing, its opponents also argued, would not ensure that clinical trials were well designed or conducted competently. 235 Even if a governmental agency selected the researchers, the researchers might perform sloppy work or engage in fraud. 236 No doubt, independent testing alone is not sufficient to ensure accurate results. 237 Nevertheless, independent testing eliminates the biggest problem: bias. 238 Moreover, the National Cancer Institute's experience in contracting with laboratories to test chemicals demonstrates that regulators can monitor and control the quality of contracted testing. 239 Opponents also claimed that having the federal government test drugs would mire the FDA in conflicts of interest because the government would both conduct clinical trials and also evaluate those trials when deciding whether or not to approve drugs. 240 There is irony in opposing government drug testing as a means to avoid conflicts of interest. The rationale for government-sponsored testing is to remove the conflict of interest that is present when a firm evaluates its products. 241 The issue, therefore, is whether government-sponsored testing would result in evaluations that were more or less biased than when a manufacturer tested its own products. Drug manufactures have a systematic bias in favor of their products, 242 while governmental agencies do not have a bias in favor of or against any particular product. 243 Certainly, some individual governmental personnel might harbor a bias towards a firm or a product, but that would not systematically slant all testing. 244 It is easy to avoid bias if a government agency evaluated the quality and results of its own work by simply having one government agency perform the clinical trials, and a separate and independent agency evaluating those trials. 245 In fact, government agencies frequently evaluate the work of other government programs. 246 For example, the Government Accountability Office ("GAO"), an independent agency, evaluates the performance of federal programs. 247 GAO reports are a model of objective evaluation, and are highly regarded. 248 It is also possible for the FDA to avoid evaluating any work performed by governmental employees or programs by having the NIH select independent contractors, who would then perform the clinical trials. 249 Then the FDA would evaluate the research performed in the private sector, just as it does today. 250 The key difference would be that the researchers would not be dependent on, influenced by, or chosen by the drug sponsor.
Currently, it requires about 15 years from the beginning of drug development until a drug can be marketed. 251 Phase I clinical trials in humans take about a year and a half, Phase II clinical trials typically take two years, and Phase III clinical trials take three to five years. 252 Opponents of independent testing also claim that independent testing would slow the 245. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 244 (indicating that the current use of distinct adjudication committees in clinical trials is a successful mode of bias elimination).
246. See Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452 (Feb. 22, 2002) (explaining that Congress directed the Office of Management and Budget to issue guidelines for governmental agencies that ensure quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information, and to require that these agencies implement administrative mechanisms permitting access to information about non-compliance with these guidelines).
247. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-5SP, SUMMARY OF GAO'S PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 1 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587949.pdf (describing the GAO's duties as including the examination of public funds, evaluating federal programs and policies, and providing analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed decisions).
248. See id. at i (highlighting the integrity aspect of the agency by stating that they take an "objective, fact-based, nonpartisan, nonideological, fair, and balanced approach" to all of their activities); see also 251. See ROWBERG, supra note 34, at 13 (providing a graph showing that the entire pharmaceutical drug process takes an average of 15 years from the inception of drug development to market approval).
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introduction of new drugs, 253 but this assertion is unpersuasive. Independent testing is unlikely to cause much delay because there is no reason that researchers chosen by the NIH should perform work more slowly than researchers chosen by a pharmaceutical firm. It might take a governmental agency longer than a drug firm to select which researchers to employ, but not much. 254 If it takes more time in developing the research protocol to ensure that clinical trials are better designed and methodologically sound, then that would be time well spent. Moreover, there are ways to take care of the problems that any delay would cause for manufacturers. 255 The Hatch-Waxman Act already extends for up to five years the period of market exclusivity that manufacturers of new drugs receive, which compensates manufacturers for part of the time that it takes them to conduct clinical trials and for the FDA to review NDAs. 256 Regulations could increase the period of market exclusivity in order to account for any increased time taken to conduct clinical trials using the new process.
B. Controlling Conflicts of Interests of Research Organizations Engaged by the Government
Having a government agency select the private organization that conducts clinical trials would not necessarily remove all conflicts of interest. There exists potential bias if the researchers with which the federal government contracted with depended on drug manufacturers for most of their research income. 257 The manufacturer could cease to employ the researchers in the future, or retaliate in other ways if the researchers produced negative evaluations of the manufacturer's products for 253 . See Examination of the Pharm. Industry, Part 6, supra note 190, at 2494 (criticizing an independent National Drug Testing and Evaluation Center because the drug progress would diminish since new products could not be approved unless it had a "significantly greater safety effectiveness" than current market-approved drugs).
254. Present Status of Competition in the Pharm. Industry, Part 10, supra note 148, at 4025 (statement of Dr. Franz Ingelfinger, editor of the New England Journal of Medicine) (arguing that a study with a potentially large financial gain would take time to pick from an extensive list of independent investigators, while a relatively dull study would also cause delay since it will be difficult to interest good researchers).
255. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4) (2012) (providing extensions for patents that were subject to regulatory review before they were commercially marketed).
256 government-sponsored testing. 258 Additionally, the risk of losing contracts from drug manufacturers could bias the evaluations of researchers. The most effective way to address this problem is to prohibit all firms and organizations that accept federal contracts for drug evaluation from performing any direct work for drug manufacturers. Fewer research organizations could thrive without doing any work for drug firms, however, and adopting this rule would reduce the pool of organizations willing to accept federal drug contracts; 259 this might make it difficult for the federal government to find research organizations capable of performing high quality work.
An alternative strategy is to reduce the degree of financial dependence rather than eliminating it entirely. The agency awarding drug evaluation contracts could offer work only to CROs or universities that earned 40% or less of their research revenue from drug manufacturers. Regulations could also direct the agency to give preference in awarding contracts to well qualified organizations that received 10% or less of their revenue from drug manufacturers.
To further reduce the risk of bias while improving the quality of clinical trials, the federal government could also contract with experts to evaluate the proposed research design and protocol before authorizing the start of the clinical trial. It makes sense to require public disclosure of the proposed research protocol and the review of experts that evaluated it, and to allow the public to comment on the proposed research protocol. Based on the expert evaluation and public comments, the government agency could ask the research organization to revise its trial design and research protocol as needed.
C. Begin Independent Testing With New Drugs
We can distinguish among three categories of drug trials: (1) those used to support NDAs; (2) post-marketing trials required by the FDA as a 258. This sort of conflict of interest also occurs when independent medical review organizations evaluate decisions of insurers to deny medical services. Even when public authorities select the review organization, the review organizations often depend on the insurer whose decisions they assess. Typically, these review organizations earn much of their income from performing other work for insurers. Insurers that are displeased with a decision of an independent review organization can select another organization to employ for this work. See condition for granting marketing approval; and (3) other post-marketing approval trials not required by the FDA. 260 Independent testing should start with clinical trials to support NDAs. 261 Federal law already requires that drug companies submit evidence on drug safety and effectiveness, and to specify how to conduct these trials when the drug companies seek approval to market a new drug. 262 The FDA probably then has authority to promulgate regulations that require that such clinical trials be designed and conducted by an independent organization that is selected and supervised by a federal agency. Congress also could create this requirement by amending the FDCA, and firms would have to comply because with legislative change, they would have no alternative.
The FDA also has jurisdiction over certain post-marketing trials because regulations require that manufacturers monitor the risks of drugs that they market, and that manufacturers submit results from their postmarketing trials to the FDA. 263 Sometimes the FDA specifies the kind of post-marketing trials that a drug manufacturer must perform, particularly if the NDA revealed potential serious drug risks. 264 The FDA or Congress could require that drug firms finance independent clinical trials for those post-marketing studies. It is hard for the FDA to ensure that drug firms complete post-marketing studies because the FDA lacks the ability to routinely stop a manufacturer from marketing an approved drug. 265 In contrast, regulatory authorities in the European Union have such power
